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Abstract 
Agrarian structures are often characterized by some kind of economic inertia. It is particularly 
puzzling why unprofitable farms persist over time instead of being sold. In this paper we ana 
lyze the exit decision of farmers using the real options approach. The validity of the real op 
tions theory is assessed by means of laboratory experiments. Our results show that real op 
tions models are able to predict actual disinvestment decisions better than traditional invest 
ment theory. Nevertheless, the observed disinvestment reluctance was even more pronounced 
as predicted by theory. This finding suggests the inclusion of bounded rationality into norma 
tive disinvestment models. 
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1.  Introduction 
Structural  change  in  agriculture  is  frequently  characterized by  some  kind  of  inertia.  That 
means farmers respond surprisingly slowly to changes in the economic environment. The fact 
that land prices are often systematically higher than their fundamental value based on future 
cash flows from land use raises the question as to why farmers continue producing instead of 
selling their land (Turvey, 2002). Structural change in agriculture is, in essence, the outcome 
of aggregated investment and disinvestment decisions of farmers.  
Several explanations for sluggish (dis)investment behavior have been developed. More re 
cently, the Real Options Approach (ROA) has been propagated as a comprehensive explana 
tion concept for economic inertia (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The real options theory ana 
lyzes irreversible decisions in a dynamic context, utilizing the analogy between a financial 
option and a real (dis)investment. It asserts that a firm may increase its profit by deferring an 
irreversible investment though the expected present value of the investment cash flows ex 
ceeds the investment costs. Similarly, it may be optimal to defer an irreversible disinvestment 
even if the expected present value of the firm’s cash flow falls below the liquidation value. 
The intuitive reason is that in cases of irreversible decisions, waiting has a positive value 
since new information about the expected cash flow arrives in subsequent periods. As long as 
the disinvestment has not been made, a decision maker has the flexibility to continue an ongo 
ing project. This is valuable in the event of increasing cash flows. Termination of the project 
(the firm) deletes this option and reduces the decision maker’s flexibility. The loss of flex 
ibility must be covered by the liquidation value, too, before a disinvestment becomes optimal. 
This mechanism results in a kind of inertia, which has been called a “tyranny of the status 
quo” (Dixit, 1992). 
The ROA has been intensively used in agricultural economics for about 15 years (e.g., Purvis 
et al., 1995; Odening et al., 2005); however, most of these applications are normative and thus 
they merely indicate the potential explanatory value of the ROA for observed economic iner 
tia. A few attempts have been made to provide empirical evidence for the validity of the ROA 
in general and in an agricultural context in particular (e.g., Richards and Green, 2003; Hi 
nrichs et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the econometric validation of theoretical models explain 
ing disinvestment behavior, such as the ROA, is plagued by some fundamental difficulties. 
Among them are unobservable  explanatory variables, ambiguity of explaining factors and 
unobserved heterogeneity. In view of these difficulties in econometric estimation based on 
field data, it seems quite natural to resort to economic experiments for a validation of the 
ROA. Laboratory experiments allow data collection under controlled conditions as well as the 
elicitation of otherwise unobservable variables. Thereby the internal validity of empirical re 
search can be improved (Roe and Just, 2009). Despite these advantages, the experimental in 
vestigation of real options theory is still in its early stages. Rauchs and Willinger (1996) were 
among the first in testing the irreversibility effect of real options in an experimental setting. 
Yavas and Sirmans (2005) adopted this idea and found that participants invest earlier than 
predicted by the ROA as well as that their willingness to pay for an investment opportunity 
included an option value. In a recent study, Oprea et al. (2009) investigated whether real op 
tions values in a monopolistic environment differ from those under competition. All afore 
mentioned studies considered the value and the timing of investment decisions and the expe 
riments were carried out with students. In the present study, we investigate if the real options 
approach is able to predict observed (dis)investment behavior of agricultural entrepreneurs 
and if these predictions are better compared to the simple Net Present Value (NPV) criterion 
and how risk aversion influences the decision process. The article is organized as follows: 
The next section derive normative hypotheses from the theoretical disinvestment model. The 
subsequent section describes the design of the experiments followed by a presentation of the 
outcome of the experiments. The article ends with a discussion on the validity of theoretical 
disinvestment models and directions for further research. 2 
2.  Derivation of Hypotheses 
Here we describe the disinvestment decision as a simple optimal stopping problem.
1 In con 
trast to standard options models we prefer a discrete time framework. Moreover, we assume 
an additive model of risk instead of a multiplicative one. Both assumptions ease the design of 
the subsequent experiments and they do not affect the qualitative insights of the model. 
The basis of the following considerations are an already existing project with a finite lifetime 
of three periods that currently earns an annual cash flow  0 X . The cash flow follows a bi 
nomial process, i.e., in period 1 the cash flow will either increase by a value  0 > h  with prob 
ability  p  or decrease by h with probability  p − 1 . In period 2 the cash flow can take the fol 
lowing values:  h X 2 0 +  with probability 
2 p ;  h X 2 0 −  with probability ( )
2 1 p − ; and  0 X  with 
probability  ( ) p p − 1 2 .  We  first  assume  a  risk  neutral  decision  maker  who  has  to  decide 
whether to continue or to abandon the project. Termination of the project yields a salvage 
value L in addition to the cash flow of the current period. The project cannot be restarted once 
it has been terminated. In other words, the decision to abandon the project is irreversible. Tra 
ditional investment theory asserts that the project should be terminated if the liquidation value 
0 X L+  exceeds the continuation value C ˆ . Consequently, the value of the project,  0 F , is: 
( ) 0 0 1 ˆ ; ˆ max : F X L C D = +
 , 
where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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1 1  is a discount factor and r  denotes the interest rate. By equating the contin 
uation value C ˆ  defined in equation (1) and the liquidation value  0 X L+  we receive the disin 
vestment trigger  0 ˆ X : 
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According to the NPV, the project should be terminated if the current cash flow falls below 
0 ˆ X . The situation is different if the decision on the termination of the project can be deferred 
to period 1. Using financial wording, the decision maker now has an abandonment option in 
period 0 that he/she can either exercise or retain until maturity. Deferring the decision has the 
potential advantage that it allows the decision maker to take into account information which 
may emerge in period 1. Of particular interest is the situation where  h X r L h X + < ⋅ < − 0 0 , 
which implies that continuation (termination) is the favorable decision if the cash flow in pe 
riod 1 increases (decreases). According to the ROA the project value is given by: 




max : F X L C D = +   (3)
with a continuation value of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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1   We employ dynamic programming for deriving our hypotheses. This covers the analogy between real options 
and financial options. However, a contingent claim approach would complicate the model and introduce pa 
rameters that are difficult to handle in an experiment, particularly the convenience yield. 3 
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Thus, the myopic NPV differs, in general, from the ROA. The difference between the two 
disinvestment triggers is: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
1
2 1 ~ ˆ
0 0 >
+ ⋅ +
+ ⋅ − ⋅
= −
q p q
q p p h
X X   (6)
Apparently,  0
~
X  is smaller than  0 ˆ X  as long as  0 > p . Against this background we formulate 
the following alternate hypotheses:  
H0: The disinvestment behavior of farmers is consistent with the NPV. 
H1: The disinvestment behavior of farmers is consistent with the ROA. 
Equation (5) also allows investigating the impact of increasing uncertainty on the optimal 
disinvestment trigger. Increasing uncertainty is considered via a mean preserving spread of 
the cash flow. A mean preserving spread can be implemented in our simple model framework 
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Obviously the relation  0 0
~ ~
X X ′ >  holds for  % 50 = p . This finding is reflected in the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Farmers tolerate lower cash flows before disinvesting if the volatility of investment re-
turns increases. 
Note that a higher volatility does not inevitably result in a later termination of the project. The 
reason is that a higher volatility reduces the optimal disinvestment trigger, but at the same 
time the probability of passing a certain trigger level increases. Thus, the effect of the volatili 
ty on the first passage time of the stochastic process is ambiguous.  
So far, the disinvestment triggers have been derived assuming a risk neutral decision maker; 
however, there is empirical and experimental evidence questioning this assumption (e.g., Ye 
suf and Bluffstone, 2009). As mentioned above, risk preferences are also relevant for the val 
uation of real options if it is impossible to set up a replicating portfolio of traded assets which 
duplicates the stochastic outcome of the investment project (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The 
valuation of a risky prospect can be conducted in an expected utility framework either by re 
placing uncertain outcomes by their certainty equivalent or by using risk adjusted discount 
rates. Let  r r >
*  denote the risk adjusted discount rate and 
* * 1 r q + = . In this case, the mod 
ified disinvestment triggers for the NPV and the ROA are: 
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(9)
respectively. A comparison of the equations (8) and (9) with the equations (2) and (5) shows 
that risk aversion increases the disinvestment trigger of both decision rules. This finding leads 
to our final hypothesis: 4 
H3: Risk averse farmers disinvest earlier. 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of uncertainty on the timing of 
investments and disinvestments if a risk neutral valuation is not possible. The reason is that 
uncertainty influences the time value of the real option as well as the certainty equivalent of 
the project’s cash flows. While both effects have the same direction for an investment, they 
may compensate each other in the case of a disinvestment. In any case, testing of H2 and H3 
requires knowledge of the decision makers’ risk attitude, which must be taken into account in 
the design of the laboratory experiments. 
3.  Experimental Design 
Our experimental design follows Sandri et al. (2010) and consists of two parts. The first part 
describes a problem of optimal stopping, stylizing a context free choice to abandon a project 
for a constant termination value. In the second part, a session of Holt and Laury (2002) lotte 
ries (HLL) was conducted with real payments to elicit risk attitudes of the participants. Lot 
tery comparisons have been preferred over a certainty equivalent method because they avoid 
possible distortions by a certainty effect (Levy and Levy, 2002). This method has also been 
favored over psychometric scales (e.g., Zuckerman, 1971), as lottery comparisons are consis 
tent with the experimental disinvestment task, being based on monetary choices under risk 
with real payoffs at stake. Furthermore, some general information about the participants’ cha 
racteristics (e.g., gender, education and age) was collected. 
The design of the optimal stopping experiment employed the model outlined in the previous 
section. Within each round, respondents could decide to stop an ongoing project in one of ten 
periods. This task was repeated over multiple rounds. Returns from the existing project fol 
lowed a binomial arithmetic Brownian motion with  % 50 = p , no drift and a standard devia 
tion of 500 (200). First period cash flows were always 1,000 points. To simplify matters for 
the participants, the risk free interest rate was fixed at 10%. Abandoning the project yielded a 
constant revenue of 11,000 points, was allowed in each of the 10 periods and was made com 
pulsory in the last period to limit the planning horizon for all participants. 
The binomial tree in Figure 1 visualizes possible realizations of the stochastic returns and 
their probabilities. In period 0 the participant will receive 1,000 points. If the participant de 
cides to disinvest in period 0, he receives the initial cash flow of 1,000 points plus the salvage 
value of 11,000 points. In such a case, the cash flow in subsequent periods is not relevant for 
this investor. If the participant opts for a continuation, the cash flow in period 1 increases to 
1,500 or decreases to 500 points, each with a probability of 50%. The binomial tree will be 
adjusted accordingly.  Irrelevant states are suppressed and the probabilities for future cash 
flows are updated. These steps are repeated until period 10 unless the participant terminates 
the project earlier. There were 20 repetitions of the experiment per individual carried out be 
cause we wish to discriminate between different decision rules. For a single realization of the 
stochastic process the NPV and the ROA (or a heuristic) may lead to the same optimal deci 
sion. Hence, it would not be possible to infer which rule underlies the actual decision of the 
participant. For each of the 20 rounds, the entire binomial tree was newly determined via a 
random mechanism. Hence, over the course of the entire experiment each respondent was 
confronted with 20 different, randomly determined paths of the binomial tree. The respon 
dents did not receive immediate payoff feedback, except in a trial run. The random cash flow 
developments  were  separately  determined  for  each  individual.  With  no  immediate  payoff 
feedback and randomly determined paths of revenues, we limited reinforcement learning from 
outcomes. 
 5 
Figure 1: Binomial tree of potential revenues together with the associated probabilities 
of occurrence (standard deviation 500 points)  
Period 0  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5  Period 6  Period 7  Period 8  Period 9  Period 10 
   6,000 
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The disinvestment experiment was carried out in two treatments (between subjects), differing 
in the size of potential gains and losses, i.e., the volatility. Specifically, the potential gains and 
losses were 200 points in the low volatility treatment and 500 points in the high volatility 
treatment. The participants were informed about all parameters and assumptions underlying 
the experimental setting. The binomial tree of potential revenues with their associated proba 
bilities of occurrence was displayed on their screen. Respondents learned the development of 
payoffs (the outcome of the random process) from period to period. After each period and 
before the decision whether or not to disinvest had to be made, the binomial tree was updated 
based on the random outcome that had occurred in the previous period.  
To ensure incentive compatibility of the experiment the hypothetical disinvestment decisions 
were related to an actual payment. A randomly selected participant could win between 300 
and 1,000 € depending on the scores attained in the real options experiment. For HLL the se 
lected respondent will also receive a payoff that is dependent on his/her expressed preference 
for or against various risky, mutually exclusive alternatives. The whole experiment took about 
60 minutes per individual. Choices made by participants were not time constrained. A trial 
run gave the participants the opportunity to become acquainted with the experiment. The ex 
periment was conducted in 2009 as an online experiment in which 63 agricultural entrepre 
neurs participated. That means that in total 1,260 decisions (20 repetitions for each of the 63 
participants) were observed. 6 
4.  Normative benchmarks 
For  the  evaluation  of  the  disinvestment  behavior  observed  in  the  experiments  and  for  an 
evaluation of our hypotheses we have to derive normative benchmarks which reflect the NPV 
and the ROA, respectively. Therefore, we determined the risk adjusted discount rate and cal 
culated the exercise frontiers. The determination of the risk adjusted discount rate is based on 
the results of HLL. While the exercise frontier for the NPV can be easily calculated, the nor 
mative benchmark of the ROA has to be determined by backward dynamic programming (cf. 
Trigeorgis, 1996:312). The resulting normative benchmarks, i.e., the “optimal” solutions for 
the disinvestment trigger according to the NPV and the ROA, are presented exemplarily in 
Figure 2 for a risk neutral decision maker. The exercise frontiers of the ROA increase expo 
nentially reflecting the diminishing time value of the disinvestment option. The trigger values 
start at 858 and 495 points for the low and the high volatility scenario, respectively. Both 
curves coincide with the NPV criterion (1,100 points) at maturity, as is required by theory. 
Figure 2: Disinvestment trigger for a risk neutral decision maker 
 
As mentioned earlier, a higher volatility of the cash flow leads to a lower disinvestment trig 
ger for the ROA, but this difference does not necessarily translate into a later disinvestment 
time. Actually, when simulating the binomial tree and applying the optimal decision rule for a 
risk neutral decision maker we found that an optimal disinvestment should take place in pe 
riod 4.09 in the low volatility scenario and in period 4.18 in the high volatility scenario. How 
ever, the difference in optimal disinvestment times widens if the calculation is based on the 
observed risk aversion of the participants, which facilitates statistical testing of hypothesis 2. 
5.  Results 
Table 1 summarizes the main results of our experiments and provides information about the 
characteristic variables of the participants. In total, 63 farmers participated in the experiments; 
30 were assigned to the high volatility treatment and 33 to the low volatility treatment. Partic 
ipants were recruited through alumni networks of German universities. The alumni provided 
us with addresses of active farmers who were invited to participate in the online experiments. 
The participants were also asked to suggest other farmers who might be willing to conduct the 
experiments. The participating farmers were relatively young with an average age of 30 years, 
a minimum of 21 years and a maximum of 65 years. The proportion of farmers with an aca 
demic background was relatively high. Both features reflect a kind of sample selection that 
can be related to the fact that the experiments were conducted online and the manner in which 
participants were recruited. On average, the participants were slightly risk averse.  
 7 
Table 1: Descriptive statistic 





Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Normative disinvestment follow 
ing NPV  0.913  2.525  0  0  0.435  1.801 
Normative disinvestment follow 
ing ROA  4.777  3.807  4.124  3.758  4.435  3.794 
Experimentally observed time of 
disinvestment   6.412  3.448  6.091  3.734  6.244  3.603 
Variance between observation 
and NPV  5.499  4.145  6.091  3.734  5.809  3.945 
Variance between observation 
and ROA  1.635  4.556  1.967  4.604  1.809  4.582 
Correlation between observa 
tion and ROA (Kendall’s Tau)  0.275   0.278  0.306  0.283  0.292   0.334 
Risk attitude of participant  4.930  1.946  5.090  1.684  5.020  1.800 
Age of participant  30  10  31  11  30  10 
Percentage of farmers studied  72.41  –  81.25  –  77.05  – 
Percentage of female participants  24.14  –  21.88  –  22.95  – 
 
The aforementioned disinvestment rules were applied to 1,260 random applications of the 
discrete arithmetic Brownian motion. The NPV criterion predicts a (risk adjusted) disinvest 
ment time of 0.91 periods on average in the high volatility scenario and an immediate disin 
vestment in period 0 in the low volatility scenario. The corresponding predictions from the 
ROA amount to 4.78 and 4.12 periods, respectively. The actual disinvestment time chosen by 
the participants was period 6.41 (high volatility) and 6.09 periods (low volatility). In the fol 
lowing, we discuss whether or not these findings support our hypotheses on the disinvestment 
behavior. 
Test of H0 
The disinvestments took place in the period which is suggested by the NPV in only 8.1% of 
all 1,260 observations. In the majority of all cases farmers chose to disinvest later. The aver 
age deviation between the predicted and the actual disinvestment time is 5.81 periods. This 
difference in the means of the disinvestment time is statistically significant (p value < 0.001, 
two sided t test). On this basis, we reject H0 and conclude that the NPV criterion, in general, 
is not appropriate for predicting actual (experimentally observed) disinvestment behavior. 
Test of H1 
The average deviation between observed and optimal disinvestment time according to the 
ROA amounts to 1.81 periods. This deviation is also significantly different from zero (p 
value < 0.001, two sided t test). Nevertheless, in 26.1% of the observations the participants 
disinvest during the optimal period. That means that more than one fourth of all of the disin 
vestment decisions are correctly predicted by the ROA, which is significantly higher com 
pared to the NPV. In 51.8% (22.1%) of all cases farmers decided to disinvested later (earlier) 
than optimal. Nevertheless, these figures treat all responses as independent observations and 
thus ignore the panel structure of the data. Figure 3 provides additional information on indi 
vidual’s decision behavior. Panel 3a depicts the empirical distribution of the average devia 
tion between the actual disinvestment time and the optimal disinvestment time for all 63 par 
ticipants. Means are calculated from the 20 repetitions observed per individual. The majority 8 
of the farmers (24 people) tend to hold on too long, for 2.50 periods on average, while a small 
group disinvests prematurely (4 people). Interestingly, there are 11 farmers who act on aver 
age in accordance with the ROA. The differences shown in Figure 3a are significant from 
zero for 41 farmers (65%) at a significant level of 5%. It is notable that the educational level 
of farmers did not have any significant influence on the deviation between the optimal and 
actual disinvestment time. 
Figure 3: Distribution of the differences between observed and optimal disinvestment 
periods (N=63) 







































Figure 3b sheds some light on the regularity of individual decision making by displaying the 
distribution of the standard deviation of the differences in disinvestment time. Apparently, the 
standard deviation is rather high. About 75% of the participants have a standard deviation of 4 
periods or more, which means that the deviation of their decisions relative to the ROA is ra 
ther unstable. In other words, individual decision rules are not characterized by a constant bias 
relative to the ROA. Instead, overestimation and underestimation of the optimal disinvestment 
period may occur for the same individual. Given the complexity of the decision problem, the 
observed deviations between actual and optimal behavior are not very surprising. Neverthe 
less, one would expect that the ROA is able to predict an individual’s propensity to postpone 
a disinvestment conditional on a particular application of the stochastic process. Thus, for a 
further investigation of the predictive power of the ROA we calculate rank correlation coeffi 
cients (Kendall’s tau) between optimal and actual disinvestment periods for each individual 
(see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Correlation between optimal disinvestment date after ROA and experimental-


























The mean of Kendall’s tau for all farmers is 0.29, meaning that the higher the optimal disin 
vestment period is the later observed disinvestment occurs. The rank correlation is positive for 
87.9% of the participants and in 53.5% of all cases the correlation is significantly different 
from zero (at a significance level of 5%). Again we observe a pronounced variability over 
individuals: Kendall’s tau ranges from  0.43 to 1.00. This finding emphasizes the large hete 
rogeneity in individual decision making procedures. On this basis, hypothesis 1 is rejected, 
but ROA outperforms NPV. 
Test of H2 and H3 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 we ran a model in which we regress the observed disinvestment 
periods  on  the  risk  aversion,  age  and  gender  of  farmers,  as  well  as  the  volatility  of  the 
project’s cash flow. The results of this regression are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2: Regression of the observed individual disinvestment period (N=1,260) 
a) 
Parameter  Coefficient  Robust standard error  p-value 
Constant  8.520  1.835  0.000 
HLL value   0.419  0.165  0.011 
Volatility (0: low volatility1: high volatility)  0.194  0.604  0.748 
Age   0.030  0.032  0.354 
Gender (0: female, 1: male)  0.571  0.767  0.457 
a)  R² = 0.111 
 
The estimated coefficient of the risk aversion parameter is significant and has a negative sign. 
This result confirms our third hypothesis. Age and gender of farmers did not affect the disin 
vestment  period  significantly.  The  sign  of  the  dummy  variable  representing  the  volatility 
treatment is positive, but not significant. If one argues that the difference of the average op 
timal disinvestment times between the high and the low volatility scenario is rather small 
(4.77 – 4.12 = 0.65 periods), this result seems to be quite plausible. To test hypothesis 2 we 
had to compare the individual disinvestment triggers for both scenarios. Unfortunately, these 
disinvestment triggers are not directly observable, yet we can approximate them by measuring 
the minimal project cash flow that has been observed for a participant while he/she was will 
ing to continue the project. Clearly, this proxy lies above the true disinvestment trigger and 
ignores the time dependence of the exercise frontier; however, these errors prevail in both 
volatility treatments. The result is that the mean of the minimal cash flow is 858 for all far 
mers in the low volatility scenario. In line with theoretical arguments, the corresponding value 
in the high volatility scenario is considerably lower (587). Table 3 summarizes the empirical 
results with regard to the validity of our hypotheses. On this basis, hypotheses 2 and 3 are not 
rejected.  
Table 3: Validity of hypotheses on disinvestment behavior 
  Hypotheses  Validity 
H0  The disinvestment behavior of farmers is consistent with the NPV.  Reject 
H1  The disinvestment behavior of farmers is consistent with the ROA.  Reject, but ROA outper 
forms NPV 
H2  Farmers tolerate lower cash flows before disinvesting if the volatility 
of investment returns increases.  Fail to reject 
H3  Risk averse farmers disinvest earlier.  Fail to reject 10 
6.  Discussion und Conclusions 
Disinvestments and, in particular, farm exits represent basic decisions for agribusiness prac 
tices involving substantial risk. Due to their irreversibility, these decisions are important for 
understanding structural change in agriculture. Advocates of the ROA have argued that uncer 
tainty and irreversibility cause inertia. Thus, policy instruments designed to provide incen 
tives for a disinvestment should take this into account and compensate the adjustment cost 
and value of waiting related to the disinvestment option. Otherwise, they will fail to trigger 
the desired behavior of farmers. 
Unfortunately, the econometric validation of theoretical models explaining disinvestment be 
havior, such as the ROA, is plagued by some fundamental difficulties. Among them are unob 
servable explanatory variables, ambiguity of explaining factors and unobserved heterogeneity. 
In view of these problems, we pursued a different approach in this paper and studied the dis 
investment behavior of farmers in a laboratory experiment under controllable conditions. The 
observed disinvestment decisions were contrasted with theoretical benchmarks derived from 
static (NPV) and dynamic investment models (ROA). 
The main findings from this experimental study are first that participants (farmers) postpone 
taking an irreversible decision, such as project termination even, if the risk adjusted NPV of 
the project cash flow falls below the liquidation value, hence rejecting traditional investment 
theory. A further insight from our experiments was the superiority of the ROA in explaining 
disinvestment behavior in comparison with the NPV. The predicted disinvestment period was 
on average closer to the observed disinvestment period and we found a significant positive 
correlation between the two. Moreover, the hypothesized impact of the volatility on the disin 
vestment trigger was confirmed by our results. Basically, we do not expect individuals to car 
ry out the computations necessary to make disinvestment choices fully consistent with real 
options reasoning. Nevertheless, we have evidence that many participants understand at least 
intuitively the value of waiting and apply decision rules that result in choices somewhat con 
sistent with those that would have occurred if they had applied such real options reasoning.  
However, even though (intuitive) real options reasoning seems to be more appropriate to ac 
count for individuals’ behavior than the NPV approach, an “options based” inertia appears 
not to be the entire story, at least for two reasons. Firstly, farmers tend to disinvest even later 
than suggested by the ROA. The observed bias is smaller than for the NPV, but it is signifi 
cant on average. Secondly, the heterogeneity of deviations between respondents raises the 
question as to if a single microeconomic model is capable to explain individuals’ disinvest 
ment behavior. Several studies question the rationality assumption underlying most micro 
economic models (Conlisk, 1996; Gardebroek and Oude Lansink, 2008) and it appears that 
“psychological inertia” also plays a role in explaining reluctance towards (dis)investment de 
cisions. In behavioral economics several drivers for this phenomenon have been discussed, 
such  as  sunk cost  fallacy  (Ross  and  Staw,  1993)  or  the  status  quo  bias  (Burmeister  and 
Schade, 2007). It would be interesting (and challenging) to disentangle these very different 
perspectives on inertia in disinvestment decisions from the option based inertia focused on in 
our experiments. 
As already mentioned, the experimental examination and testing of real options settings still is 
in its early stages. Moving on a rather unexplored terrain, we consider our study a small but 
important first step on the way towards a better understanding and rationalizing of termination 
choices. A lot of work remains to be done to better understand what exactly drives different 
individuals’ decision making in disinvestment situations. With regard to possibly bounded 
rationality of decision makers, it would be interesting to test whether simple heuristics can 
predict disinvestment behavior with the same precision or even better than sophisticated mi 
croeconomic models. Stop Loss rules or rules such as “terminate the project if the project 11 
returns fall x times in a row” could be candidates for such heuristics. Another interesting path 
to be taken is comparing the behavior of farmers with other entrepreneurs, as farmers have 
been alleged to be particularly conservative and averse to changes (e.g., Jose and Crumly, 
1993). Finally, we suggest investigating the effect of framing on disinvestment choices: Will 
farmers be more “attached” to a project that is described in terms that are more familiar to 
them? Framing might also be helpful in making a laboratory experiment more realistic and, 
thereby, increasing its external validity. 
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